The Mk I "Little Boy" was 10 feet (3.0 m) in length, 28 inches (71 cm) in diameter and weighed 8,900 lb (4 000 kg). The design used the gun method to explosively force a hollow sub-critical mass of uranium-235 and a solid target spike together into a super-critical mass, initiating a nuclear chain reaction. This was accomplished by shooting one piece of the uranium onto the other by means of chemical explosives. It contained 64 kg of uranium, of which 0.7 kg underwent nuclear fission, and of this mass only 0.6 g was transformed into energy.
No full test of a gun-type nuclear weapon had occurred before the "Little Boy" device was dropped over Hiroshima. The only test explosion of a nuclear weapon had been of an implosion-type weapon using plutonium as its fissionable material, on July 16, 1945 at the Trinity test. There were several reasons for not testing the "Little Boy" device. Primarily, there was little uranium-235 compared with the relatively large amount of plutonium which, it was expected, could be produced by the Hanford reactors. Additionally, the weapon design was simple enough that it was only deemed necessary to do laboratory tests with the gun-type assembly (known during the war as "tickling the dragon's tail"). Unlike the implosion design, which required sophisticated coordination of shaped explosive charges, the gun-type design was considered almost certain to work.
Although occasionally used in later experimental devices, the design was only used once as a weapon because of the danger of accidental detonation. Little Boy's design was unsafe when compared to modern nuclear weapons, which incorporate safety features to endure various accident scenarios. The main objective of Little Boy was to create a weapon that was absolutely guaranteed to work. As a result, Little Boy incorporated only basic safety mechanisms.
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The project stemmed from a 1914 report that Belgian soldiers were using an armor-plated Minerva sedan car to raid the German Army. Inspired by this knowledge, Rolls-Royce quickly armored an assortment of Rolls-Royce Silver Ghosts donated by private citizens. The cars were shielded with 3/8” thick armor plate, fitted with dual rear axles and two machine guns, with 3,000 rounds of ammunition. They carried a crew of three and despite their crudeness (and four ton weight), could reliably maintain 60 mph on dirt roads, thanks to the seven-liter, six-cylinder engine.
Each car had a five-foot steel machine gun turret, with an open wooden platform behind it. The hood was armor-plated and the vulnerable radiator shielded by two armored doors, which could be closed by the driver. The driver sat on the mattress-covered floor, leaning against a canvas sling, looking through a narrow slit. The only other alteration was to install 13 leaf springs in front and 15 leaf springs at the rear, for the added weight.
The armored cars were organized into fifteen squadrons. They weren’t suited for the stalemated Western Front, so were dispatched to Africa and the Middle East. Most went to Egypt, sporting names like “Bull Dog,” “Biter,” “Bloodhound,” and “Blast.”
They were spectacularly reliable—“a triumph of British workmanship”—crowed The Times, but awkward and ungainly. In fact they were mistaken for water trucks by a German spy in West Africa; a costly mistake, one imagines.
Colonel T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) commanded a fleet of nine Rolls-Royce armored cars in Palestine. On one single day, Lawrence took three of the cars and captured two Turkish posts, blew up a bridge, wiped out a Kurdish cavalry regiment, blew up another bridge, and ripped up miles of rails, throwing the whole Turkish supply system into chaos.
After the Armistice, the journalist Lowell Thomas asked Lawrence if there was anything he would like to have. Lawrence answered, “I should like to have a Rolls-Royce car with enough tires and petrol to last me all my life.”
The early passenger car conversions were so effective, the War Office ordered specifically-designed armored cars to be built on the Silver Ghost platform. These cars were assigned chassis numbers WO1–279. Officially phased out in 1922, some served in India during World War II until they were all scrapped in 1944.
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In keeping with the British concepts at the time, the Matilda tank was developed for a role as infantry support. Although well armored, the relatively weak engine power and troublesome suspension severely limited the speed of the vehicle. This shortcoming, however, was not considered an issue as the vehicles intended role was to provide close support to the infantry. As shown though combat, the heavy armor of the Matilda's cast turret became legendary; and for a time in 1940-41 the Matilda earned the nickname "Queen of the Desert".
However, in the rapid maneuver warfare often practiced in the open in the wide open spaces of North Africa, the tank's low speed and unreliable steering mechanism
became major problems. Another problem was the lack of a high-explosive capability (the appropriate shell existed but was not issued). Ultimately, the lack of speed and maneuverability of the Matilda, along with the Afrika Korps deployment of the 88 mm anti-aircraft gun in the anti-tank role eventually doomed the Matilda in this theatre of war.
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Confirming the rule that armies always prepare to fight the previous war, the idea of tanks fighting tanks was an anathema to the U.S. Army of the 1930s, just as it had been to the combatants of the First World War, who used tanks supported by infantry to 
assault positions held by infantry, not to fight other tanks. Defense against massed enemy armor was just that – defense. Aggressive anti-tank tactics was a doctrine forced on the American army by the Wehrmacht's romp across Poland in September 1939. The German’s success forced the Americans to build from scratch an anti-tank capacity, which culminated in the formation of the Tank Destroyer Forces.
After being tested in the Fall 1941 maneuvers, the anti-tank concept won a certain independence from the infantry and field artillery. This independence was limited due to a continuous and rancorous debate of the doctrine and use of AT forces. While there was agreement on the necessity of such formations, the head of each of the existing combat arms, except Armor, wanted responsibility for these new units.
In early December 1941, putting an aggressive spin on the "anti-tank" function, the battalions were renamed Tank Destroyer, and a Tank Destroyer Tactical and Firing Center was activated at Ft. Meade, Maryland. The Center was moved shortly thereafter to Camp Hood, Texas, where it was enlarged in March 1942 to form the Tank Destroyer Command, whose mission was to coordinate the creation and training of the new units.
The aggressive spin that attached to the title "Tank Destroyer" was based on the mobility, speed, and tactics these units possessed in theory. Often, however, the practical function of motorized TD units was reconnaissance, a function inconsistent with two-thirds of their "Seek, Strike, Destroy" motto. Initially, lack of adequate firepower posed an unwarranted liability to the success of these units’ primary mission of combating enemy armor, and the Army's Ordnance Department never ceased its efforts to improve the armament of Tank Destroyer forces.
There were many high-level discussions of "light" and "medium" versions of tank destroyer vehicles and weapons. With their low velocities and small calibers, both the 37-mm and 57-mm rounds were totally inadequate against enemy armor; German armor, in particular, which was specially designed to resist larger-caliber penetrating rounds. Ordnance test results were embarrassing: the tiny 37-mm shells were unable to pierce relatively thin wood even at a range of less than 100 yards, yet 37-mm guns were ordered in large quantities, probably to appease influential congressmen. The 37-mm and 57-mm guns had limited success against Japanese armor. Incredibly, the 37-mm guns were installed in the rear decks of M-6 trucks ("Fargos"), which were little more than stretch Jeeps. North Africa proved how vulnerable and unsuccessful these armed M-6 trucks were. Ordnance even experimented with a 37-mm half-track jeep, but that combination never left the proving grounds. Towed-gun battalions were subsequently armed with 76-mm cannons.
Ultimately, a French 75-mm gun was installed in a half-track. The 75-mm gun was woefully outclassed by the infamous German 88-mm gun, which featured a 28" to 30" high-velocity round. The thinly-armored half-tracks were not as fast as German armor, and they presented very high silhouettes as targets. Additionally, the half-track had to face the target during firing: its gun could not traverse.
Gen. Lucian Truscott, who rose from command of the 5th Cavalry Regiment to command of the 5th Army during the war years, used the Kasserine Pass debacle to underscore the inadequacy of the TD units’ firepower:
"My Tunisian experience also provided me with an outstanding example of how American soldiers can be indoctrinated in training. Our tank destroyer battalions, organized only a few months previous, with no historical prototype, equipped with an improvised weapon – an almost unarmored half-track mounting an entirely inadequate 75-mm gun – had been taught during their training that it was their duty to seek out and destroy enemy tanks. The number of half-tracks which these gallant units left on the Tunisian deserts was mute testimony to the superiority of German armor, and antitank guns. It was also evidence of the efficacy of their indoctrination, a mark that I was to note among these units throughout the war."
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"After Kerscher had closed on me, he radioed and pointed to the right. A "Stalin" tank was broadside to us next to a barn. It was a vehicle we hadn't yet seen in the Northern Sector of the front.
We were startled for a moment, because the tank was outfitted with an extremely long 122-mm cannon.
This was the first Russian tank cannon with a muzzle brake.
Moreover, the "Stalin" tank looked somewhat similar in it's shape to our "King Tiger." After I initially hesitated, just as Kerscher did, it occured to me immediately that only the running gear was typically Russian. I fired and the tank burst into flames. After this short disgression, we finished off all of Ivan's vehicles in the village, just as we had arranged earlier.
Kerscher and I later had to laugh because we had thought for a moment that we had had a "King Tiger" in front of us that had been captured by the Russians. In the heat of battle, however, such things could sometimes come to pass."
- Otto Carius: Tigers in the Mud.
The IS-2 tank first saw combat in the spring of 1944 and were assigned to separate heavy tank regiments, normally of 21 tanks each. These regiments were used to reinforce the most important attack sectors during major offensive operations. Tactically, they were employed as breakthrough tanks. Their role was to support infantry in the assault, using their large guns to destroy bunkers, buildings, dug-in crew-served weapons, and other 'soft' targets. They were also capable of taking on any German AFV if the need arose. Once a breakthrough was achieved, lighter, more mobile T-34s would take over the exploitation. The IS-2 weighed about the same as a German Panther, and was lighter than the German heavy tanks, the Tiger series. It was slightly lower than both. A major weakness was the two-part ammunition, which slowed the rate of fire considerably. A second weakness was the very limited ammunition supply of only 28 rounds. This was the price paid by the small size of the design. One of the IS-2's most notable engagements took place during the fighting in August 1944 to establish a bridgehead over the river Vistula around the town of Sandomierz.. This was the first time the IS-2 had come up against the fearsome Tiger II. During the engagement on August 13, the 71st Independent Heavy Tank Regiment's eleven IS-2s blocked an attack by fourteen Tiger IIs of the 105th Heavy Panzer Regiment. An engagement at about 700 meters (770 yd) coupled with skilled tactical handling saw four Tiger IIs destroyed for the loss of three IS-2s and seven damaged.
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In 1776, Jean Baptiste de Gribeauval was assigned to the position of general of artillery in the French Army. In this capacity, he trained younger officers, including Napoleon Bonapart and was able to implement his artillery reforms on a broad scale. He increased the wages given to soldiers and improved the living quarters of lower-ranking men. In addition, Gribeauval was able to standardize the caliber of cannons and increase their mobility by reducing tube lengths and weights. He also introduced the howitzer, which was commonly used by other armies of the time. 
Gribeauval designed waterproff ammunition wagons that were lighter than their predecessors. He developed specialized training for officers that incorporated aspects of career management. Gribeauval’s reforms made the French army a leader in the use of artillery. It remained a superior European fighting force into the nineteenth century.
Gribeauval’s artillery reforms indirectly affected the fledgling American army. Gribeauval’s proteges; several officers who had been trained by Gribeauval, later served in the fledgling American army. One of the most influential of Gribeauval’s proteges was Louis de Toussard. Many of Gribeauval’s artillery reforms were adopted by the American military, and remained in effect until after the Civil War. They continued to play a role and influence the U.S. military through World War One.
Masterpiece Models - http://www.masterpiecemodels.com - asked me to produce a pair of Gribeauval Cannons to be included as a part of a larger exhibit that Masterpiece Models has been commissioned to construct. I was asked to depict the cannons as they were used by the United States Marine Corps during the War of 1812.
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The Caterpillar D7 series medium bulldozer began service with the U.S. military during World War II. With upgrades and changes, it has been a workhorse for the U.S. Military for over fifty years, fulfilling its primary earthmoving role as well as a host of other roles discovered for it, for example mine clearing with a special flail adapter kit.
The idea for this project is based upon a photograph showing a D7 Dozer clearing the wreckage of a Panzer IV from the roadway.
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"Fuhrer is convinced that immediately after the delivery of Sturmpanzers to the units there will be great need for this type of vehicles." – Albert Speer.
During a conference on October 2, 1942, Speer presented the plans of a new Sturmpanzer and on October 14, 1942, designs were shown to Adolf Hitler. Based on these designs, Hitler ordered production of 40 to 60 new vehicles that should be ready by spring 1943. The new Sturmpanzer was to use the Panzer IV chassis and the 150mm StuH 43 L/12 gun (developed into a tank mounted weapon from the sIG 33 by Skoda). At the same time, Hitler also requested that the new design be mounted with a 210mm or 220mm mortar, but this never happened. In February 1943, Skoda produced a wooden prototype of the new Sturmpanzer IV (Sturmpanzer 43). The vehicle was designated Sd.Kfz.166, Sturmgeschütz IV mit 15cm StuH 43.
"We always were considered a ‘fire brigade’ unit, and always were used when the infantry was in trouble and lots of artillery had to be brought down at the enemy and fast. More than one infantry regiment blessed us after we had smashed a heavy attack of the enemy…Funny thing, though. As happy as the commanders of the supported units were when we smashed an enemy attack, the ‘Landsers’, the line infantry, were glad when we left, because enemy artillery fire was pounding them to hell while we were there. They could not change the locations of their fox holes, but we could move back and forth and sideways to escape enemy artillery at least to some extent" – Joseph Scharrer, 3rd Company of Sturmpanzerabteilung 216, from May of 1943 to October of 1944.
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This is one of those "afternoon" projects, well, at least the construction portion. The Allied Groupbuild hosted by Lu Rodriguez on ML is the push I needed to pull this little gem off of my shelf. I am using the MIG Productions 1/48 Dodge WC, and speaking of Lu, a big "hats off" on his wonderful rendition of the vehicle as shown on the box art.
Lu’s work, however, posed a bit of a problem for me. Although I wanted to do this vehicle I didn’t want to replicate, nor have my work compared to his fine example…yep, I’m chicken. So, while busy trying to avoid replicating Lu’s work I hit upon the idea of asking for his help. I’m lazy, afterall, and if he had done research for the box art then perhaps he would have some inspiration references he would be willing to share. Lu, who is also an admitted "lazy" modeler had a nice chuckle 
and then produced a beatuiful reference vehicle from his collection. The vehicle is shown in a sand finish sporting twin .50 caliber weapons mounted in the rear bed. As an added touch a field modified fuel can rack is mounted to the rear. Perfect.
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